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THE FULL COMPENSATION DOCTRINE IN CORPORATE
REORGANIZATIONS: A SCHIZOPHRENIC STANDARD
DEPRESSION-BORN financial difficulties brought a mass of corporate reorgani-
zations before judicial and administrative tribunals.' The decisions of these
bodies elaborated and refined Boyd's 2 command that senior claimants be pail
before juniors participate in the assets of the rejuvenated company.8 This
doctrine demands that the new capitalization reflect a reasonable valuation
of the emerging company's assets. The new security structure must be "feas-
ible": fixed charges and debt maturities must be geared to avoid default due
to fluctuations of the business cycle. Within the new capital framework a
plan must be "fair and equitable. ' 4
These "words of art" require that claims of creditors must be satisfied
strictly in the order of their contractual priorities.5 Under this rule of "absolute
priority," applicable to both solvent and insolvent corporations,0 senior claim-
ants must be fully compensated for the "entire bundle of rights" they sur-
render, i.e., the full value of their old claims. Payment may be in either cash
or securities, and in the issuance of the latter the relative priorities of the old
1. The Interstate Commerce Commission and the Securities Exchange Commission
are the two agencies that have handled the bulk of the reorganization cases, and their
views have profoundly affected the rules of reorganization law.
2. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913), discussed in Rostow & Cutler,
Competing Systems of Corporate Reorganization: Chapter X and XI of the Bankruptcy
Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334 (1939). For an earlier analysis, placing Boyd in context, see
Frank, Somie Realistic Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 19 VA.
L. REv. 541; 19 VA. L. REv. 698 (1933). For a pre-depression repetition of the Boyd
rule, see Kansas City Terminal Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 454 (1926).
3. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 403 U.S. 106 (1939). The decision
is discussed in Dodd, The Los Angeles Lumber Products Cornpany Case and Its Inplica-
tions, 53 HARv. L. Rsv. 713 (1940). See also Comment, Distribution of Securities in
Corporate Reorganization, 51 YALE L.J. 85, 109 (1941). The rules of reorganization were
further expanded in Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois. 312 U.S. 510 (1941),
discussed in Comment, supra; Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943); and Ecker v. Western Pacific RR., 318 U.S.
448 (1943). These last two cases are analyzed in Swaine, A Decade of Reorganization
Under Chapter 77 of the Bankruptcy Act, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1037; 56 HaRv. L. R v, 1193
(1943).
4. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 525, 530-1 (1941);
Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 318
U.S. 523, 541, 544-5 (1943). For a discussion of the problem of determining the new
capitalization, see Field, Valuation for the Purpose of Corporation Reorganizatiot, 16
RocKY MT. L. R-v. 13 (1943).
A further requirement is that voting control in the reorganized enterprise must be
based on substantial equity holdings. Ecker v. Western Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 481
(1943).
5. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
6. See Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510, 527 (1941).
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capital structure need not be maintained.7 The requirement is that seniors
receive the "equitable," if not the cash, equivalent of the rights which feasibility
forces them to surrender.8 Only after this is done may junior claimants par-
ticipate at all; if the requirement cannot be met, their claims are eliminated
as "worthless."9
"Fair and equitable" thus requires valuation of the old claim, and a de-
termination that the compensation offered in return is "full." While the first
requirement has been the subject of extensive discussion,'0 the second requires
further consideration. The problem arises in four statutory settings: tvo
bankruptcy and two non-bankruptcy. These are: (1) Section 77 1 and (2)
Chapter X12 of the Bankruptcy Act, (3) Section 11 of the Public Utility
Holding Company Act'-3 and (4) Section 20b of the Interstate Commerce
Act.' 4
FuLL COMPENSATION UNDER SEcrioN 77
Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act requires the reorganization of insolvent
railroads to be "fair and equitable."'1 It necessitates ICC approval of plans
before their submission to stockholders.'0 The poor financial position of debt-
laden railroads and ICC insistence that "feasibility" requires conservative
capital structures wrought drastic changes in railroad capitalizations. "Abso-
7. Id. at 528-0; Ecker v. Western Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 448 (1943). "But at any
rate, under the absolute priority rule of the Boyd case, the stratification of securities issued
to creditors need not follow invariably the relative priority of the claimants' Id. at 484.
Accord, Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, MWilwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R.,
318 U.S. 523, 557-8 (1943).
8. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 22S U.S. 42, 508 (1913); Kansas City Terminal
Ry. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 454, 455 (1923); Consolidated Rock
Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 528-31 (1941). For an expression of the SEC's
view of "fair and equitable," see Childs Company, 24 S.E.C. 85, 123 (1946).
9. Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 30 U.S. 106, 123 (1939).
10. For an excellent discussion of the various methods in which claims have bhen
measured and the impact of the "investment value" approach on corporate reorganizations,
see Comment, Allocation of Securities in Corporate Reorganirations: Claims Mcasuremcn:
Through Ivestment Value Analysis, 61 YALE UJ. 656 (1952).
11. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1946).
12. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 501 et seq. (1946). This chapter vas formerly
§ 77(B) of the Bankruptcy Act, 4S STkT. 912 (1934).
13. 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79K (1946).
14. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20b (Supp. 1952).
15. 47 STAT. 1474 (1933), 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1946). For a discussion of the standards
of fairness applied in pre-§ 77 days, see Svaine, Rcorganization of Corporations: Certain
Developments of the Last Decade, 27 Co. L, RE. 901 (1927); 28 COL. L R v. Z9
(1928); Rodgers & Groom, Reorganization of Railroad Corporations Undcr Section 77
of the Bankruptcy Act, 33 Coi. L. Rm,. 571 (1933). The pre-77 standards and abuses
are criticised and the prospects of curing them discussed in Frank, note 2 supra. For a
more recent discussion of railroad reorganizations, see Polatsek, The W1rech of the Old
77, 34 COR-NELL L.Q. 532 (1949).
16. The procedures and statutory standards of § 77 are discussed in Dodd, Reorgani-
zation Through Bankruptcy: A Remedy for What?, 43 HAr. L REv. 1100 (1935).
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lute priority" was enforced, and the total liquidation claim of an old invest-
ment became the base line for valuation of its worth, with consideration given
to other contract rights.
Ecker v. Western Pacific R.R. 17 laid the doctrinal cornerstone of full
compensation under Section 77. Outstanding, in the order of priority, were
(1) RFC-held trustees' certificates; (2) First mortgage bonds; (3) Secured
notes held by the RFC, the Railroad Credit Corporation, and the A. C. James
Co. The secured indebtedness totalled approximately $87 million, while ICC-
approved capitalization amounted to $84 million,' consisting of first mortgage
bonds, income bonds, preferred and common stocks.19
Allocation of new securities was based primarily on seniority in the old
capital structure. Thus, at one end of the spectrum, the trustees' certificates
received the entire issue of new Firsts. 20 At the other, unsecured creditors and
stockholders were wiped out.21 Junior noteholders' claims were partially
eliminated since the secured indebtedness exceeded the total value of new
securities. 22  Old first mortgage bondholders received a combination of new
Incomes, preferred and common stocks equal to the face amount of their
claim .
23
Allocations between the old Firsts and the notes were complicated by the
fact that the notes, though generally junior, held senior liens on some portions
of the debtor's road. Both groups received combinations of new Incomes and
preferred and common stocks; but the old Firsts obtained a larger percentage
of choice securities. 24 The Supreme Court held the allocations valid despite
the ICC's failure to assign dollar values to both the old claims and new securi-
ties. Since allocations were based on the properties underlying each mortgage,
dollar valuation was "immaterial. ' 25 Neither did the fact that old Firsts re-
17. 318 U.S. 448 (1943).
18. Id. at 456. There were also some $2.75 million in equipment obligations outstand-
ing, but these were left undisturbed by the reorganization. Id. at 460.
19. The amount of each type of security to be issued was based on estimates of
future earnings. Id. at 459, 481.
20. Id. at 485-7.
21. Id. at 462.
22. Id. at 480-1.
23. The combination given in exchange for their $62.43 million claim consisted of:
(1) 4-32 % Income Bonds-$19,716,040; (2) 5% Preferred-$29,574,060; (3) Common-
230,593 shares valued at $57 per share. Id. at 461.
T'his relatively simple method of allocation was complicated by the treatment given the
RFC-held notes. These heavily collateralized securities were consolidated with the RFC's
trustees' certificates in a single claim, and received compensation on the same basis as the
old first mortgages. The effect of the consolidation was simply to improve the treatment
of the RFC notes. Unable to see "why all claims of RFC may not be considered by the
commission as a single claim," the Court upheld the special treatment. Consideration for
it was found in the RFC's acceptance of new Firsts at par in lieu of the" more valuable
trustee's certificates. Id. at 486-7. Thus, the fact that RFC notes fared better than those
of the Railroad Credit Corporation or A. C. James Co. did not violate absolute priority.
24. Ibid.
25. Id. at 482-3. For the opinion of the lower court on this point, see In re Western
Pacific R.R. Co., 124 F.2d 136, 139 (9th Cir. 1941).
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ceived payment in securities of "lower dignity" invalidate the plan, even
though noteholders obtained some similar securities. The notes held a lien
senior to the old Firsts on some assets. Moreover, Boyd does not require
stratification of new securities according to the relative priority of old claims.G
Another variation on compensation according to seniority was introduced in
the division of losses between notes held by the Railroad Credit Corporation
and those of the A. C. James Co. These losses, made necessary because claims
exceeded securities to be issued, were prorated according to the security
behind the notes, rather than their face amount. Thus the RCC notes were
paid at roughly face value, while equal-ranking but less heavily secured notes
of A. C. James bore almost the entire loss.2  Since noteholders were not
fully compensated, 2s exclusion of those junior to them was proper.2  Brush-
ing aside the claim that increased war earnings required higher overall
capitalization,30 the Court found the plan fair and equitable.
The requirements of full compensation were developed further in the
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific case,31 decided the same day as
Western Pacific. Three major bond issues, "Generals," "Fifties," and "Ad-
justments," secured by liens on major portions of the road, constituted the
bulk of the indebtedness. 32 There were also several smaller issues secured by
liens on minor segments of the road. The plan proposed substitution of
26. Ecker v. Western Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 448, 484 (1943).
27. The treatment given these classes may be summarized as follows:
Amount of New New NA
Old Face Income Preferred Commo
Claim Bonds Stock Sloch
R.C.C. $2.6 million $154,111 $241,681 34,425 shs.
A. C. James 6.25 million 163,724 256,756 37,625 shs.
By way of contrast, RFC-held bonds received $1,185,200 in bonds, $1,777,'30 in
preferred and 15,788 shares of common on their claim of roughly $ 3.9 million. Id. at 455,
461. Had RFC bonds beer. treated on the same basis as the others, they would have
received $414,175 in bonds, $649,516 in preferred, and "its proportion of common stock."
Id. at 486.
28. Id. at 488.
The loss sustained by noteholders is emphasized by the fact that stock issued to them
was valued at $62 per share, while that issued to more senior claimants w%-as valued at $57.
Id. at 486.
29. Id. at 476-7, 481.
30. Evidence showed that while the plan vas based on future normal earnings
of $2.0 million, twice that amount had been earned in 1941 and five times it in 1942.
Id. at 507. The Court rejected these figures as abnormal, stating that the ICC's forecast
was based on past experience in war and peace. Id. at 509.
31. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Mila3ukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R.,
318 U.S. 523 (1943).
32. The most important was the General Mortgage, with a first lien on the debtors'
main line east of the Missouri. Second were the 50-year 5's, with a first lien on the
western line, subject to an $8.9 million issue held by the R.F.C., and a second lien on the
eastern sectors. Third were the Convertible Adjustment bonds, holding the most junior
liens on both sectors. Id. at 530.
33. Id. at 530-1. The total indebtedness of the road amounted to S0.7 million. Id. at
19541
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system-wide issues as follows: (1) New Firsts, (2) Income bonds in two
series: Class A, with a first claim on earnings, and Class B, (3) Non-Cumula-
tive preferred, and (4) Common stock. 4 Since the new capitalization fell
below the claims of bondholders, old stockholders were eliminated.85
Distribution of securities was complicated by the fact that various old bonds
held first liens on different divisions of the road. Seniority among these lien-
ors was based, therefore, on the relative earnings potential of the securing
divisions. Generals, which were secured by the profitable Eastern division,
were senior to the other major bond issues. But bonds secured by a first lien
on the Milwaukee & Northern division had an even better earnings record.
These bonds, therefore, received a higher percentage of new Firsts than the
old Generals; both received the remainder of their claim in new Incomes and
preferred stock.3 6
While agreeing with this method, the Supreme Court pointed out that
earnings could not be the sole basis for allocation between divisional liensY07
Fifties, next senior of the major issues, secured by a first lien on the deficit
Western division, were entitled to compensation on the basis of the strategic
importance of that division. And issuance to them of securities, equal in
rank to some of those given the Generals, was justified. The superior earnings
position of the Eastern division was recognized; 60% of the securities given
to the Generals were senior to all of the Fifties' new securities.83 Dollar valua-
tion of old and new securities was again deemed unnecessary. 9
The Generals advanced a further objection to the plan. They received
merely the face amount of their claim in securities inferior to those surrendered,
while junior interests participated. The Court upheld the objection since
Adjustments, wholly junior to both Generals and Fifties, received substantial
portions of common stock.40 Senior interests were therefore entitled to com-
pensation for their loss of senior rights above the mere receipt of inferior
34. The new First Mortgage was to have a first lien on the entire system, subject
to equipment obligations. The Income would have a second system lien. Interest on both
classes of Incomes was cumulative to 13y,%, and both classes had a sinking fund with
yearly payments from net income of Y2% of their aggregate principal. Class B's were
convertible into common at a rate of ten shares per bond. The preferred was to have
voting rights and could participate in income up to $1 per share after common received
$3.50 per share. Id. at 531-2, n.5.
35. Id. at 534-5.
36. Ibid. For a discussion of claims valuation in this and other § 77 cases, see
Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 656, 663-669 (1952).
37. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R,
318 U.S. 523, 561 (1943).
38. Id. at 563. As the Court saw the problem, it was not one of a first and second
mortgage, but of fitting each of the divisional liens into the new capital structure so that
their relative positions with respect to assets and earnings would be retained. Ibid.
39. "A requirement that dollar values be placed on what each security holder sur-
renders and on what he receives would create an illusion of certainty where none exists
and would place an impracticable burden on the whole reorganization process." Id. at 565.
40. Id. at 569. The Adjustment bonds were to receive $174.9 million in common stock,
which was $55.5 million short of their total claim. Id. at 535.
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securities with a face value equal to the old claim. This "something extra"
could be an increased share in earnings, assets or voting control; but without
it, senior rights were invaded for the benefit of junior interests:.
The Court found insufficient compensation in participation rights of the
new preferred, a sinking fund for the new Firsts, a 3 year cumulative feature
of the Incomes, and a voting trust established to protect creditors. Introducing
a substantial element of ambiguity into the holding, the Court added that
these factors could not be considered as compensation for lost seniority rights
because they had not been considered in this light by the ICC. The case was
remanded to the Commission with instructions that it determine what addi-
tional compensation, qualitative or quantitative, should be given the Generals.
The remittitur of the St. Paid reorganization 4 3 brought forth the first re-
sponse of ICC and District Court to the Supreme Court's formulation of full
compensation. The plan was amended to give senior interests "something
extra" for loss of seniorit3 The Generals received 107o of their claims in
cash and an increased portion of new Firsts. Their share of new preferred
was reduced accordingly; and the stock thus released was passed to more
junior claimants.4  Since cash was superior qualitatively to the bonds sur-
rendered, the Generals were found fully compensated.4 5
The two Denver & Rio Grande Wcstern cases4-0 amplified the Supreme
Court's view of contentions, rejected in WVcstcrn Pacific and St. Paul, that
41. Id. at 569-70. Cf. Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510, 529
(1941), discussed pages 826-7 infra. This "something extra" requirement has become
a vital part of federal reorganization law. Its applications in proceedings under Chapter
X, § 11, and § 20b are discussed in fra.
42. Group of Institutional Investors v. Chicago, Iilwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R.,
318 U.S. 523, 570-1 (1943). The Court took the position that it was the ICCs function
to determine whether loss of seniority was fully compensated, and that on review its
decision must stand if supported by evidence. However, the language uscd in remanding
was significant. "Certainly we cannot say that the inclusion in the new seccurities ... of
features normally common to them are adequate compensation for the lost seniority....
[T]he Commission and the District Court should determine what the General Mortgage
bonds should receive in addition to a face amount of inferior securities equal to the face
amount of their old ones, as equitable compensation, qualitative or quantitative, for the
loss of their senior rights." Ibld. On the basis of this language, later cases have uni-
formly accepted the principle that something extra must be given when senior rights are
surrendered. See, e.g., Wisconsin Central Ry. Reorganization, 2S2 I.C.C. 393, 497 (1952);
Community Gas & Power Co., 25 S.E.C. 92, 103 (1947).
43. In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 53 F. Supp. 384 (N.D.
Ill.,), appeal dismissed, 145 F.2d 299 (7th Cir. 1944), cert. dcnicd sub now. Park v.
Group of Institutional Investors, 324 U.S. 857 (1945).
44. In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 53 F. Supp. 3M4, 383 (N.D.
Ill. 1944). The revised plan also provided a sinking fund for the benefit of old senior
creditors, to be created by payments equal to 50% of dividends paid on new common
stock. The fund was to be applied first to the retirement of new Firsts, then to Income
Bonds, and then to preferred stock. Ibid. New preferred stockholders were given the
right to vote in case their dividends were not paid. Id. at 339.
45. Id. at 391.
46. R.F.C. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.I , 328 U.S. 495 (1946), 60 Hnv.
1954]
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post-approval changes of circumstance required ICC reexamination of the
plan. The Rio Grande reorganization satisfied the claims of seven classes of
bondholders, but the eighth (Generals) received only 10% of their claim.47
The Generals rejected the plan; however, the District Court, utilizing the
"cram down" provision of Section 77, approved it on the ground that the
Generals' rejection was unreasonable. 48
After ICC approval, the road prospered due to profitable wartime operations.
Claims were reduced by $8.5 million and an additional $30 million were added
to the capital account. 49 The Generals contended that, since the Commission
found all senior creditors fully compensated, both cash accumulations and
securities originally allocated to the retired claims belonged to Generals. The
Circuit Court agreed. 0
The Supreme Court reversed. The Circuit Court had fallen into error
by assuming that, because Generals participated, creditors senior to
them had been paid in full.51 The ICC had made no finding that the cash
value of the new securities equalled the face value of the old. Rather it found
that the plan as a whole fully compensated senior interests because of the
possibility of "unlimited dividends" on common stocks they received.5 2 Thus
the Commission's plan contemplated high wartime earnings-"the one thing
that gave senior creditors compensation for the admission of junior claimants
... before the seniors obtained full cash payment.... .",3 Creditors receiving
common stock therefore obtained an equity in all cash accumulated after the
plan's effective date. Similarly, once that cut-off date was past, reduction in
the size of new bond issues was for the benefit of the new common, compen-
sating them "for their loss of payment in full in cash."'5 4 Since the plan was
fair and equitable, its rejection by the Generals was unreasonable and the
District Court's use of the "cram down" provision correct.55
L. REv. 291, 14 U. oF CmI L. REv. 84; Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & Rio
Grande Western R.R., 329 U.S. 607 (1947).
47. R.F.C. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 502 (1946).
48. In re Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 62 F. Supp. 384 (D. Colo. 1944),
revnd, 150 F.2d 28 (10th Cir. 1945), rev'd mib norn. R.F.C. v. Denver & Rio Grande
Western R.R., 328 U.S. 495 (1946).
49. R-F.C. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 328 U.S. 495, 514, 524 (1946).
50. In re Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 150 F.2d 28, 35-39 (10th Cir. 1945).
51. RtF.C. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. 328 U.S. 495, 523 (1946).
52. Id. at 517.
53. Id. at 518. The Court then pointed out that income for the year just prior to the
ICC's approval of the plan was "at its highest." Ibid.
54. Id. at 525. The Court's references to the necessity of giving seniors full cash
payment for securities surrendered is emphasized by its citation of the fact that the $100
par common was selling on the market for $31Y. Id. at 519.
55. Id. at 533-4. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, vigorously challenged this view.
Since 80% of a class rejected the plan and a circuit court of appeals agreed with them, he
found it difficult to believe that their action was unreasonable or motivated by hostility
to the general interest. Id. at 537, 546. He concluded that seniors were in effect receiving
double payment on their claim: (1) securities for the claim; (2) cash to buy up the
claims. Id. at 544-5.
[Vol. 63 :812
THE FULL COMPENSATION DOCTRINE
After unsuccessful attempts to get the District Court to reconsider, junior
interests again appealed. This time they argued that post-war changes in
circumstances required reexamination of the plan.P The Supreme Court
again rejected the request. The allegations of change in circumstance were
held fatally defective because they failed to contend that the cash value of
allotted securities equalled the face amount of senior claims.a" The Court
then emphasized its cash value approach by citing the current market prices
of the new securities.
The latest decision in another case, the Wisconsin Central reorganization, 9
indicates that the advent of Rio Grande did not alter the ICC's original view,
exemplified in the St. Paul remittitur,GO that future cash accumulations should
benefit all claimants holding any equity. The WJisconsin Central plan provided
for distribution of such cash to the most senior creditors and release of an
equivalent face amount of allocated securities to junior interests. 1
Equally important was the ICC's compliance with the "something extra"
requirement. The Commission specifically rejected the contention that full
compensation is achieved only when the market value of new securities equals
old claims.0 2 Old Firsts received 90% of their claim in new Firsts and 10%
in cash.' 3 The ICC's treatment of more junior Superior and Duluth divisional
56. Insurance Group Committee v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 329 U.S.
607 (1947).
57. Id. at 617.
58. The table drawn by the Court showed that for the year preceding, the Market
High-Low range of all the new securities, except the First bonds, w.,as wvell below par.
Id. at 617 n.6. The implication of this table and the language used is that seniors are
not fully compensated until they receive new securities which sell on the market for
prices equal to the face value of old claims.
For another cash value approach to the Rio Grande reorganization, see Guaranty Trust
Co. N% Chase National Bank, 194 Misc. 628, S6 N.Y.S.2d 505 (Sup. CL 1949), aff'd, 277
App. Div. 767 (1st Dep't 1950), aff'd, 302 N.Y. 6.8, 98 N.E2d 474, cert. dc:icd sub
nor. Baird v. Guaranty Trust Co., 342 U.S. 819 (1951). The court there held that
regardless of whether seniors were found fully compensated under § 77, they may
collect on accommodation collateral unless their bankruptcy payments equalled 100 cents
on the dollar.
59. Wisconsin Central Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 393 (1952). The road entered
equity receivership in 1932 and filed a bankruptcy petition under § 77 in 1944. Id. at 395.
Earlier ICC proceedings are reported at 267 I.C.C. 423 (1947).
60. There the ICC did precisely what the Supreme Court later refused to require of
it. The $15 million cash distribution came from post-approval earnings, and the $7 million
of new Firsts came from retirement of a senior claim. Moreover, by passing released
stocks down the line, the revision allowed juniors to obtain greater participation. See
pages 817-18 szpra.
61. Wisconsin Central Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 393, 493 (1952). A further
contrast with Rio Grande is shown by the fact that, largely on the basis of increased
earnings and physical improvement of the road, the ICC increased the capitalization from
the maximum of $46.8 million allowed in the previous plan, id. at 399, to M59 million.
Id. at 431.
62. Wisconsin Central Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 567, 570-2 (1952).
63. Wisconsin Central Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 393, 479 (1952). While their
maturity was extended, the old Firsts received a lien on all the debtors' property, and also
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bonds further clarified its view of full compensation.04 Starting from the
proposition that these bonds had a $10 million claim bearing 47o interest, the
ICC stated that qualitatively full compensation required an annual return of
$400,000 per year. New bonds previously allotted to them would bring in
$230,000, and therefore common stock sufficient to earn an average of $170,000
must also be allocated. 65 The total face value of the bonds and stock necessary
to produce the required earnings was $11.25 million. The excess of $1.25
million quantitatively compensated Superior and Duluths for lost seniority.
Thus issue of a bonus amount of. new securities was introduced as an alterna-
tive to qualitative superiority as a means of providing "something extra."
Recent chapters in the quarter-century Missouri Pacific reorganization 00
shed further light on many aspects of Section 77 reorganizations. In sharp
contrast to Rio Grande, the Eighth Circuit in 1947 ordered the ICC to recon-
sider its plan because of changed circumstances. 7 The ICC agreed that a
substantial reduction in outstanding claims and large cash accumulations stem-
ming from greatly increased profits made revision necessary. 8 The result was
greater participation of junior interests.69
obtained a sinking fund. They were found fully compensated, even though juniors also
received new Firsts. Id. at 496. For a complete summary of the proposed capital struc-
ture in tabular form, see id. App. A at 509.
64. The Superior and Duluth divisional Firsts were competing for seniority with
General Refundings who held a second lien on the entire system. Analysis of the under-
lying assets of each issue disclosed that the Refundings' secured position was stronger.
Moreover, one third of the Superior and Duluth's claim exceeded the security and was
therefore eliminated. Id. at 488-90. Both classes received securities in excess of the face
value of their claims, but Refundings received a better mix. The Superior and Duluths
received new securities with a total face amount of $1,500, including $550 in new Incomes,
for each $1,333.3 of claim. Refundings received $1,650, including $1,000 in new Incomes,
per $1,593.6 of claim. Each received $150 in new Firsts. Id. App. A at 510.
65. Id. at 497 n.64.
66. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, 275 I.C.C. 59, 275 I.C.C. 203 (1949).
See also State of Texas v. Group of Institutional Investors, 93 F. Supp. 832 (E.D. Mo.
1950), aff'd, 191 F.2d 265 (8th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 904 (1952). The debtor
first filed under § 77 in 1933, Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, 212 I.C.C. 662 (1936),
and has been before the Commission periodically ever since. E.g., 230 I.C.C. 5 (1938);
257 I.C.C. 479 (1944). Another I.C.C. decision in the case is pending.
67. Wright v. Group of Institutional Investors, 163 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1947). See
Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, 275 I.C.C. 59, 60 (1949).
68. Claims against the company had been reduced by about $45.5 million, while
cash on hand at the close of 1948 amounted to $82.6 million. Id. at 60-61. Of this amount,
$35.5 million was available for distribution to senior creditors. Id. at 122. The prior
plan had been based on estimated normal earnings of $22 million, but the 1943-48 average
had been $39 million. Id. at 84-5.
69. Under the 1944 plan, junior bondholders received warrants, and preferred stock-
holders nothing. Missouri Pacific R.R., 257 I.C.C. 479, App. E at 577-579 (1944). Under
the 1949 plan, however, these bondholders received new preferred and common stock,
while old preferred holders received nearly 20% of their claim in new common. Missouri
Pacific R.., 275 I.C.C. 59, 128-130 (1949). These changes resulted from an increase in
capitalizable income from $22 million to $25A million. Id. at 101-2.
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The compensation of bondholders produced some variations on the St.
Paul remittitur and IViscowsin Central. The senior First & Refundings
received the face amount of their claim, including an 11.7% cash distribution,
as the qualitative "extra. "7° The more junior Generals obtained preferred,
while junior-most Convertibles received a combination of preferred and com-
mon stock. Their reductions in seniority were compensated by increased in-
come expectations. 71 Special treatment was accorded Serial bonds secured by
82% of the profitable New Orleans Division's common stock. Because of its
earnings and bright prospects New Orleans' stock mwas valued at 150% of par.
In recognition of the high value of this collateral, Serial bonds received series
A Generals, the most junior class issued to the First & Refundings. The re-
mainder of their secured claim was met by series B Generals. But this alloca-
tion failed to compensate them for their loss of prospective New Orleans earn-
ings and 82% voting control of that road. They therefore received 1J share
of new common per bond, and preferred stock for the unsecured portion of
their claim.72 The Eighth Circuit approved the plan.73
Because the iissouri Pacific's earning power had been underestimated, the
ICC reopened the proceedings in 1952.74 The 1954 examiners' report increased
capitalization by one-third and allowed junior interests greater participation 7
Absolute priority, said the examiners, required that old preferred receive full
compensation for both their principal and accrued interest. 0 Observance of
liquidation claims is mandatory since bankruptcy substitutes for liquidation.
Before old common could participate, old preferred was entitled to new class
A common, equal in face amount to its claim.
77
70. Id. at 122. See id. Apps. C and D, at 162-4.
71. The 5% rate the Generals would receive on their new preferred was higher than
their old 4% coupon rate, and under the plan the 5% would be covered 1.5 times by
earnings, while in the past the 4% rate was covered 1.1 times. Similarly the Refundings,
though surrendering a 532% coupon rate, were thought to be better off because they
would in fact receive more in the future than the ,o of their coupon rate which vas the
past average. Id. at 128-9.
72. Id. at 125-6. In the anticipated normal year this combination of securities re-
ceived by the 5 's would yield a return of $50.38 per 100) of old claim. Had the
Neew Orleans been allowed to form a separate company this figure vould have reached
$59.18, but this loss of prospective earnings was made up for because of the increased
quality of the new securities. Id. at 127.
73. State of Texas v. Group of Institutional Investors, 191 F2d 265 (8th Cir. 1951).
74. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, 232 I.C.C. 629 (1952). The ICC vithdrew
the plan under 62 STAT. 167 (1948), 11 U.S.C. § 208(a) (Supp. 1952), on the ground that
economic testimony indicated changed circumstances requiring reevaluation of the entire
proposal.
75. 'Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 5918, Feb. 17, 1954.
The overall capitalization w.-as increased from $611 million to $310 million. Id. at 70.
76. The thesis that accrued interest and principal should be treated identically has
a sound basis in economic theory. See FiscHER, THE NATURE OF C&PITrAL AND I;cO!'.
215-16 (1906). It also accords with the legal requirements laid downa for bankruptcy
reorganizations in Consolidated Rock Products v. DuBois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941). See
page 827 infra.
77. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954,
p. 90.
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Although compensation of preferred absorbed the entire approved capitaliza-
tion, the possibility that earnings might again exceed expectations required
recognition of old common's potential value. Warrants were therefore issued.
To protect old preferred, these warrants were made redeemable in class B
common. Moreover, their exercise was conditioned on maintenance of high
earnings for seven consecutive years.78 This scheme was deemed justified be-
cause conversion of the warrants would not increase the value of new securities
beyond the system's capitalizable assets.79 Why this finding did not require
capitalization sufficient to allow immediate participation by old common was
not made dear.
The distributions to preferred and common appear to violate the canons of
full compensation. Old preferred received the face amount of its claim in
inferior securities while common participated.8 0 Preferred's relative seniority
was maintained by the division of new common into two classes. But its old
cumulative rights were surrendered without additional compensation. This
apparent violation of the St. Paul decision was also left unexplained by the
examiners.81
Even more dubious was the report's departure from prior ICC practice
in fixing interest rates on senior securities. Senior bondholders' insistence that
present market conditions required increased interest rates 82 forced the ex-
aminers to determine the applicable yardstick. Rejecting theoretical economics,
the report argued that full compensation requires new securities to sell at or
near par if issued in the face amount of old claims.83 Hence, they held, al-
78. Id. at 90-91. The seven years must fall within the next fifteen. The plan
provided a sliding scale of participation by common based on earnings in the stipulated
period. The scale was as follows:
System Earnings Earnings per Shares of Class B
Before Taxes Class A Sh. per Warrant
$76.1 million $11.00 0.2
$82.5 million $12.50 0.6
$89.1 million $14.30 1.0
If issued, Class B common was entitled to dividend parity with Class A only after the
latter had received $5 per share in the dividend year.
79. Id. at 92.
80. While common's exercise of the warrants may be problematical, their issuance
constitutes "participation" in a reorganization context. See Niagara Hudson Power Corp.
v. Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336 (1951).
81. The treatment of Convertible 5Y2% bonds may be open to the same criticism.
These bonds received % of their claim in 5% preferred and in 4 eo contingent interest
bonds. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954,
Apps. "I" and "J". While the examiners made no attempt to justify this result, it is
conceivable that new 4-4's were qualitatively superior to the old Convertibles, thus
satisfying the St. Paul doctrine despite the inferior status of the new preferred.
82. See, e.g., Brief for First and Refunding Bondholders, pp. 17-21, Brief for Secured
Serial 5Y4's, pp. 21-2, Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918,
Feb. 17, 1954.
83. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954,
p. 55.
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though Wisconsin Central rejected market values as the standard, ". . . the
Commission may not ignore the market conditions which may be expected to
exist within a reasonable period after the issue of the securities."4 But they
insisted that present security yields were not controlling because they fluctuate
too rapidly. Then, echoing Rio Grande, they stated the test: whether new
securities will have a reasonable chance of selling at a price equal to old claims.
Applying this test to conditions in the security market, the report recom-
mended a Y4 ' increase in coupon rates.sa
From an economic viewpoint the result is unsound. It takes little account
of the mechanisms that determine long run interest rates. loreover, it does
not coordinate bond interest rates with the return on the railroad's entire capital
structure. This return is the keystone of reorganization. Multiplying its re-
ciprocal (the capitalization rate) by future earnings determines the capitalized
value of the railroad.86
The capitalization rate is fixed by the price that must be paid for new capital.
Assuming profits sufficient to justify future investments,6 7 this price is set in
the capital market. There, lenders confront borrowers and definite supply and
demand curves are established. Profits on invested capital must, therefore, be
sufficient to divert new capital from competing uses. 8 If they exceed this
84. Id. at 63.
85. Id. at 64-7.
86. The interest rate (return on capital) is the price of capital in terms of income
and its reciprocal is the rate of capitalization. FiscHER, op. cit. smpra note 76, at 194.
Thus, the rate of interest makes it possible to determine the capitalized value of any
amount of income. Id. at 202. For example, a business earns $1,000,000 per year and
pays interest at the rate of 5%. The reciprocal of 5% is 20. Therefore, by multiplying
20 times $1,000,000, the capitalized value of $20,000,000 is f£und.
87. While the Missouri Pacific's earnings in recent years support this assumption,
see Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954, p. 36,
it is not invariably correct. Funds may be obtained to some extent by creation of deprecia-
tion and other reserves rather than in the capital market. Thus, a company unable to
obtain capital economically may avoid the market price for capital by ploughing back
earnings. FOWLER, THE DEPRECIATION OF CAPITAL 109-10 (1934).
88. The surplus value of goods produced over the cost of production is caused in part
by the employment of capital, and the resulting loss of present enjoyment of that capital
by those who furnish it. These owners of capital must be compensatcd for this loss.
MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF EcoxozmIcs 5S7 (8th ed. 1930). In short, interest arises from
this surplus or "profit." ScHiumphrETE, TaE THEORY OF Ecoomic DxWsi'P.1E:.xT 174-5
(1949). Capital must be obtained because entrepreneurs must pay for the productive
goods they use, and the capital needed to pay for these goods must in turn be paid
for, id. at 177, because present purchasing power is at a premium over future purchasing
power. This premium differential is interest. Id. at 188.
Thus, capital is a factor of production which must be paid for and, like any other
factor of production, must have a market. This market is the money market. Here
entrepreneurs, on the demand side, confront holders of capital, on the supply side, and
all kinds of economic projects enter the market and compete for realization through the
purchase of capital. Id. at 123-6. The supplier is faced wxith various alternative uses fr
his capital and sells it to the highest bidder. FISCHER, op. cit. supra note 76, at 221.
In this context, the interest rate will tend to balance supply and demand curves.
ScHua rPEvr op. cit. supra, at 191-3.
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amount, excess capital will flow in, driving the profit rate down. Thus, the
profit rate on invested capital tends to equal the interest rate on new capital80
The gross interest rate has, however, two components: (1) reward for waiting;
(2) reward for risk.00 At a given time the first is generally uniform, while
the second varies according to the risk involved. 91 Therefore, if risks are
equal, interest rates on similar investments will be similar.
Today, Class I railroads bear approximately the same risks; therefore their
composite interest rate approximates the proper one for the Missouri-Pacific.
This rate is reflected in the relation of their profits to book capital, since this
is the rate at which necessary capital will be attracted. 2 If profits were higher,
more capital would flow in, raising book values and reducing profit rates.
Conversely, if profits were lower, disinvestment would raise the profit rate.
Thus, the 4+% which railroads have earned on book capital since 1940 0
should be the average return, or capitalization rate, for reorganizations. Since
senior bonds bear below average risks, their return should be below aver-
age. The mere reward for waiting is approximated by the interest on
long term government bonds. But senior bonds bear some risk; hence their
interest rate should fall in the zone between the rate on government bonds 04
and Class I railroads' average return. The 4% fixed by the ICC in previous
reorganizations does precisely this.0 5 But the 4%% fixed by the Missouri-
Pacific examiners' report grants senior bonds a return slightly above that zone.
If, as the examiners suggest, security prices have fundamentally declined, 0
past profits of Class I railroads might be irrelevant. But the suggestion ap-
pears fallacious. Federal Reserve action, 7 designed to counteract a hardening
of money rates in 1953, evoked a prompt response. Government 3/4's rose
from 982, in May 1953, to 109 in March, while in February, average
89. This equality between the profit and interest rates occurs because new and old
capital must earn the same return for the same risks. MARSHALL, op. Cit. s'upra note 88,
at 593.
90. HicKs, VALUE AND CAPITAL 142-3 (1939); MARSHALL, op. Cit. supra note 88,
at 588.
91. Id. at 591.
92. While book capital may not be a perfect index, it appears to be the best available
recordation of the capital actually invested in an enterprise.
93. Transcript of Record, p. 8940, Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance
Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954. This 15 year period excludes the abnormally low earnings of
the depression.
94. The government long term rate is indicated by the fact that 33/4% bonds are
selling at about 109. N. Y. Times, April 28, 1954, p. 46, col. 4.
95. See, e.g., Wisconsin Central Ry. Reorganization, 282 I.C.C. 393 (1952); Missouri
Pacific R.R. Reorganization, 275 I.C.C. 59 (1949); Group of Institutional Investors v.
Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 318 U.S. 523 (1943).
96. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954,
p. 66.
97. In the latter half of 1953 the Federal Reserve System renewed open market
purchases of government bonds and also eased reserve requirements. By the end of
the year these steps freed $3.8 billion to meet demands for capital. National City Bank
Monthly Letter on Business and Economic Conditions. January, 1954, pp. 6-7.
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bond prices reached a 3-year highP3 These fluctuations not only refute the
examiners' suggestion, but also indicate the futility of fixing interest rates by
current market prices. Between formulation and approval of a plan, market
fluctuations are bound to occur. If full compensation requires that senior
issues sell at or near par, reorganizations are doomed to endless reopening.
While, since 1938, railroad bond yields varied between 2.7%8 and 5.75%0
profits on book capital remained steady. Thus, for practical as well as theoretical
reasons, returns on book capital furnish a better yardstick than current market
price for fixing interest rates.
The Section 77 cases demonstrate the meaning of full compensation in this
context. Dollar valuation of new securities need not be balanced against a
similar measure of old claims. Neither must the stratification of the old capital
structure be maintained. Rejection of these requirements gives both com-
mission and court considerable freedom in measuring the fullness of compen-
sation and in shaping feasible capital structures.
Read in its proper setting, Rio Grande does not restrict this freedom. It
does not require the cash value of new securities to equal the face value of
the old. Boyd, in demanding absolute priority, expressly states that creditors
need not be paid in cash.'00 Moreover, the rejection of dollar valuation in
Western Pacific and St. Paul bars the contention that new securities must be
the cash equivalent of old claims. But Rio Grande does limit review of Section
77 reorganizations at the behest of junior interests. Under its rule, the ICC is
not required to reopen proceedings absent a showing that the cash value of
new securities exceeds the old claims' face value. This apparently is the view
taken by the ICC and lower federal courts, as illustrated by Missouri-Pacific's
reopening and W1isconsin Centrals disposition of debt reductions and after-
acquired cash. In both cases juniors benefited without any showing that
seniors received the cash value of their claims. In view of these precedents, the
full Commission may reject the examiners' questionable reliance on market
prices in the most recent Missouri-Pacific case. Any other result would con-
flict with the earlier decisions.
Thus, the rules of full compensation are those laid down in Western Pacific
98. Ibid. See note 94 supra. The average market value of 992 bond issues listed on
the New York Stock Exchange was $100.28 and, in aggregate, exceeded their par value
by $6fl0,000. One month earlier their average market value was $99.32. N. Y. Times,
March 25, 1954, p. 47, col. 3.
99. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954,
p. 64.
100. Northern Pacific Ry. v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 4S2 (1913). The court stated that it
would not "require the impossible and make it necessary to pay an unsecured creditor
in cash as a condition of stockholders retaining an interest in the reorganized company.
His interest can be preserved by the issuance, on equitable terms, of income bonds 4r
preferred stock." Id. at 503. This view was reaffirmed in Kansas City Terminal Ry. v.
Central Union Trust Co., 271 U.S. 445, 454, 455 (1926). See Frank, supra maote 2, at 55"0-O.
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and St. Paul. Seniors must receive the face value of their claims to the extent
secured, and something extra for surrender of senior rights, if wholly junior
claimants are to participate. Subsequent cases have met the test: (1) quali-
tatively, through partial payment in cash, establishment of sinking funds, and
increased income expectations; or (2) quantitatively, through receipt of new
securities with face values exceeding those of old claims.
CHAPTER X
The reorganization of insolvent, non-railroad corporations is governed by
Chapter X, formerly § 77B, of the Bankruptcy Act.101 "Fair and equitable,"
the statutory prerequisite of approval, is left undefined. But here also, in
Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co.,10 2 the Supreme Court found in
these words the statutory incarnation of "absolute priority." There, the debtor
had outstanding one class of bonds and two classes (A and B) of common
stock. Total corporate assets amounted to $830,000, while bondholders' claims
aggregated $3.8 million. The Supreme Court rejected the plan, which gave
bondholders new preferred stock in the amount of $641,000 while allowing
Class A common to receive $188,000 in new common.' 03 Under the rule of
absolute priority, compensation of senior creditors must equal the face amount
of their claims. This standard is not met merely by maintaining the old order
of seniorities. 0 4 Junior interests could participate here only by making a
fresh contribution in money or money's worth.' 0 5 Moreover, while practical
adjustments may be made, a plan may not compensate junior interests for
surrender of whatever nuisance or "blackmail" value they may have. 10 0
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Du Bois 107 involved Consolidated and
its two wholly owned subsidiaries, Union and Consumers. Each subsidiary
had an issue of 6% bonds outstanding, while the parent had issued preferred
and common stock.' 0 The plan compensated half the principal of both
101. 52 STAT. 883 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §501 (1946); §77B: 48 STAT. 912 (1934).
The statute requires the court to secure an advisory opinion from the SEC if the bank-
rupt's indebtedness exceeds $3 million. 52 STAT. 890 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§ 572-5 (1946).
For a discussion of the relation of Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy Act, see Rostow
& Cutler, Competing Systems of Reorganization: Chapters X and XI of the Bankruptcy
Act, 48 YALE L.J. 1334 (1939).
102. 308 U.S. 106, 115 (1939).
103. Id. at 109-111. The equity of the Class B common was wiped out.
104. Id. at 119-20.
105. The Court rejected three claims of contribution by the common stock: (1) Con.
tinuity of management and the financial standing of the officers benefits the company;
(2) The creditors would fare worse if common had elected out-and-out liquidation;
(3) Had the corporation not gone into bankruptcy, creditors could not get any of their
principal until maturity, six years distant. The Court felt that recognition of such
"contributions" would subvert the rule of absolute priority. Id. at 122.
106. Id. at 122, 127.
107. 312 U.S. 510 (1941).
108. Union, with greater assets, id. at 517, had $2,280,555 in bonds outstanding,
while Consumers' publicly-held indebtedness equalled $1,358,715. 285,947 shares of pre-
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bond issues with new twenty-year 5% contingent bonds. The other half was met
with new 5% non-cumulative preferred stock. Interest on the old bonds, com-
prising 20% of bondholders' claims, wmas eliminated. Old preferred would re-
ceive new common on a share-for-share basis, while old common received
warrants. Net income of the new company was to be divided, one half to
service new issues replacing Consumers' bonds, the other for those replacing
Union's. 09
The Court found the plan inequitable. The equal division of income be-
tween the classes of bondholders was unsupported by a proper valuation of the
assets securing each class. In the absence of such data, said the court, fairness
of the plan "as between Union and Consumers' bondholders cannot be intel-
ligently resolved."" 0 The failure to determine earning capacity, on which
valuations could be based, made the plan unfair in another respect. It must
appear that future earnings will cover the interest and dividend requirements
of securities issued to seniors. Otherwise they would not be fully compensated
and "indefensible participation" of junior interests might result.'
In addition, the plan itself was fatally defective. The failure to treat accrued
bond interest on the same basis as principal violated the canons of full com-
pensation. And the plan's treatment of the principal claim failed to satisfy
"absolute priority." Bondholders were required to relinquish a 6% fixed
interest claim in exchange for an equal face amount of bonds bearing a con-
tingent 5% return-securities inferior to those surrendered."21 Recognizing
that feasibility may require destruction of old priorities, the court ruled that
in such cases plans "must accord to the creditor his superior rights in some
other way" before junior interests can participate. The Court conceded that
the method would vary from case to case, but indicated that increased partici-
pation in assets, earnings or control were important criteria. 21 3
ferred (liquidation claim $25 per share) and 397,455 shares of common were outstanding.
Id. at 515.
109. Interest on the bonds was to be cumulative, and both bonds and preferred were
to have the benefit of sinldng funds. Prior to bond retirement, preferred dividends would
be cumulative to the extent earned, and thereafter, fully cumulative. In addition, pre-
ferred shareholders were entitled to elect four out of nine directors, except that in
the event of delinquency on the new bonds, bondholders would elect si- directors.
Warrants issued to common on a one for five old shares basis entitled the holder to
purchase one share of new common for one dollar. Preferred also received warrants
with exercise prices of two to six dollars, depending on w:hen they were used. Id. at
515-6.
110. Id. at 524-5. The District Court had found that the fair value of the assets was
not enough to cover the respective bond issues, id. at 518, but this finding was insufficient.
Id. at 525.
111. "The criterion of earning capacity is the essential one ... if the allocation
of securities among the various claimants is to be fair and equitable:' Id. at 526.
112. Id. at 527-8.
113. Id. at 528-9. Cf. Kansas City Ry. Terminal Co. v. Central Union Trust Co., 271
U.S. 445, 455 (1926). Thus, the court made clear that maintenance of the old securities
stratification was not required by absolute priority.
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While DuBois was pending in the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit's
approval of another reorganization in Standard Gas & Electric Co. v. Deep
Rock Oil Corp.114 demonstrated the Supreme Court's doctrines in application.
Senior noteholders held claims of $14.35 million, while their compensation
was valued at $14.91 million. Of this amount, $2.9 million was distributed
in cash and the remainder in new notes and common stock.11 5 In answer to
the objections of junior claimants, the court held that the excess value of the
distribution was necessary to full compensation. Since junior interests were
participating, the noteholders must receive compensation for priorities lost by
partial payment in common stock. Thus the noteholders received a 4% bonus
which gave them an increased share in assets and voting control. In addition,
they received 20%o of their claim in cash, qualitatively superior to the notes
surrendered." 06
Use of face amount bonuses as compensation for loss of senior rights was
applied to both debentures and preferred stock in the Central States reorgani-
zation." 7 Debentures and two classes of preferred were replaced with new
common. Debenture holders were to receive the face amount of their claim
plus 5%.118 Senior preferred received their liquidation claim plus 2Y2%. 119
Junior preferred received the remainder, and old common was wiped out.12-'
Since both senior classes were losing priorities, the Fourth Circuit held the
114. 117 F.2d 615 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 564 (1941). The Circuit court
opinion was handed down January 13, 1941. Certiorari was granted in Du Bois October
28, 1940, 311 U.S. 636, and the case decided March 3, 1941, 312 U.S. 510.
115. Standard Gas & Electric Co. v. Deep Rock Oil Corp., 117 F.2d 615, 616-7 (10th
Cir. 1941). Approximately $12 million of the noteholders' claim was paid in new notes
and common stock. Ibid.
116. Since common was the voting stock, an increase in the amount of shares re-
ceived increased voting power proportionately. The Tenth Circuit, however, rested its
opinion entirely on asset value of the bonus, and did not mention either voting power or
the qualitative superiority of cash over the old notes. The ignoring of qualitative superior-
ity may have been due to the fact that if payments prior to approval of the plan were
eliminated, cash payments amounted to only 4.2% of the remaining claim. Id. at 617.
117. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1950), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951). The case is criticized in Billyou, Priority Rights of Pre-
ferred and Common Shares in Bankruptcy Reorganication, 65 HARV. L. REv. 93 (1951).
118. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, supra note 117, at 882. The SEC,
district court, and Fourth Circuit all agreed that for an investment company the appro-
priate method of valuation was the market value of securities in the portfolio rather than
capitalization of anticipated earnings. Id. at 884. For a discussion of this case in terms
of claims measurement, see Comment, 61 YAL. L.J. 656, 661-2, 667 (1952).
119. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, supra note 117, at 881. Since the total
value of assets was $38 million, and Debenture and senior preferred's claims totalled
roughly $36.5 million, ibid., little was left for junior preferred.
120. Allowing preferred their principal plus arrearages, the court thought it clear
that "the common stockholders are many millions of dollars under water." Id. at 882.
Cf. Petition of Portland Electric Power Co., 162 F.2d 618 (9th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nor. Watson v. Portland Electric Power Co., 332 U.S. 837 (1947); In re Deep Rock
Oil Corp., 113 F.2d 266 (10th Cir.), cert denied sub noain. Standard Gas & Electric Co.
v. Taylor, 311 U.S. 699 (1940).
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bonuses necessary to full compensation by arguing that, for these claimants,
the proceeding was tantamount to liquidation. If compensation for loss of
senior rights was not gven, absolute priority would be undermined. 2 '
The Child's Company reorganization 1-12 illustrates another approach. The
plan provided substitution of new no-par common, representing a $10.3 million
equity, for old preferred and common, Rejecting preferred's contention that
its 7% dividend requirement and reserve fund to guarantee dividends entitled
it to additional compensation, the SEC held that only preferred's liquidation
claim need be covered. On this basis, preferred was allotted 75% of the new
common.1 4
Despite the fact that the new securities were inferior to those surrendered,
the SEC found preferred fully compensated. First, they obtained voting con-
trol of the company. Second, in "normal" years, dividends would equal 7%
of their old investment plus arrearages; and in good years, they would receive
75% of the increment.Y Third, they obtained a '4 interest in a pending $1.8
million law suit. 2 None of these benefits, said the SEC, would have accrued
to them in their prior status1-2 7 The district court agreed.32
The cases indicate no doctrinal distinctions between Chapter X and Section
77 reorganizations. Under Los Angeles Lmnber and Da, Bois, as in Section
77, full compensation requires the face amount of new securities to equal the
value of those surrendered, and that something extra be given where senior
rights are lost. The Chapter X cases, however, place more reliance on bonuses
as quantitative "extras," than on the qualitative superiority of some part of the
compensation. Nevertheless, both types have been employed, and in Child's
Company, preferred's lost seniority was found compensated by improved earn-
ings prospects, voting control, and a 44 interest in a lawsuit.1-5 Finally,
121. Central States Electric Corp. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879, S37-9 (4th Cir. 1950),
cert. denied, 340 U.S. 917 (1951).
122. Child's Company, 24 S.E.C. 85, approved, In re Child's Co., 69 F-. Supp. 856
(S.D.N.Y. 1946).
123. Id. at 857. The SEC valued corporate assets at $10,300,00, Child's Company,
24 S.E.C. 85, 130, (1946), while the district court found them to be worth $9,9S9,0]00.
It re Child's Co., 69 F. Supp. 856, 858 (1946).
124. Child's Company, 24 S.E.C. 85, 12.3-9 (1946). The SEC took the plusition that
bankruptcy was a substitute for equity receiverships, which themselves were a substitute
for liquidation. Liquidation preferences must, therefore, control. Ibid.
125. Id. at 131.
126. Id. at 92. The SEC apparently accepted the trustee's view that the suit would
be won.
127. Id. at 131-2.
128. In re Child's Co., 69 F. Supp. 856, 859 (1946). The plan provided no cash
payment, and since preferred obtained common stock whose biare (76.67%) in twtal
assets was almost exactly the amount of their claim, ibid., it is equally clear that no
bonus of the Central States variety was given.
129. This three-fourths interest amounted to a claim of $1.35 million or approdmately
17%c2% of the total claim. If received as a bonus, discounted because subject to litigation,
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Missouri-Pacific jibes with Central States' insistence that preferred stock's
priorities are on the same footing as those of creditors vis-d-vis common. Thus,
in bankruptcy, "full compensation" requires clear recognition of any loss of
senior rights.
HOLDING COMPANY AcT REORGANIZATIONS
Section 11 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act requires holding
company systems to simplify their structures. 130 To achieve this end, reorgani-
zation plans must be submitted either voluntarily by the companies or by the
SEC in proceedings against them.131 Thus, reorganization under § 11 arose
against a background substantially different from that in bankruptcy pro-
ceedings. While insolvency was absent, over half of all holding company pre-
ferred stock had dividend arrearages.' 3 2 Although "fair and equitable" re-
mained the criterion, full recognition of liquidation claims would have elimi-
nated many common stockholders and increased industry-wide hostility to
the Act.133
United Light and Power 134 first explained full compensation in this context.
The plan called for dissolution of the top holding company (Power) and
transfer of its assets to its subsidiary (Railways). Power's stockholders were
to become stockholders in Railways. But preferred's liquidation claims ex-
ceeded the highest valuation of the assets to be transferred.13 The SEC held
"absolute priority" applicable,13 but found that in § 11 it had quite a different
meaning than in bankruptcy. In bankruptcy reorganizations creditors were
this interest would bring the Childs case in line with Central States. But the reasoning
of the district court and SEC do not require such a conclusion, and it is possible that
they felt that increased earnings and voting control, though the result of lost seniority,
compensated for the loss.
130. 49 STAT. 820 (1935), 15 U.S.C. § 79K (1946). For an overall appraisal of the
Act's background, objectives, and achievements see Comment, Section 11(b) of the Hold-
ing Company Act: Fifteen Years it Retrospect, 59 YALE L.J. 1088 (1950). See also Dodd,
The Relative Rights of Preferred and Common Shareholders in Recapitaliaalion Plans
under the Holding Company Act, 57 HARv. L. Rlv. 295 (1944); Note, 93 U. or PA.
L. Ray. 308 (1945).
Section 11(b) (2) of the Act states three grounds for requiring simplification: (1)
Where voting power is unfairly distributed, (2) Where there are more than two levels
of holding companies, (3) Where the operating companies controlled do not constitute
an integrated system.
131. §§ 11(e) and 11(b) (2). Most companies chose the former method. Comment,
supra note 130, at 1107.
132. Dodd, supra note 130, at 308.
133. See Comment, supra note 130, at 1111.
134. 13 S.E.C. 1 (1943). While this was not the first § 11 case, it was the one that
fixed the pattern for later cases. For an earlier SEC decision under the Act, see Federal
Water Service Corp., 8 S.E.C. 893 (1941).
135. The SEC found the maximum value of assets to be $81.5 million, while pre-
ferred's liquidation claim was $98.7 million. United Light and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 1,
4-5 (1943).
136. Id. at 7.
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prevented from liquidating the debtor's property, and therefore their liquida-
tion rights must be protected.13 7 Here, the company was virtually without
debt and under no financial embarrassment. Therefore the fact that preferred's
liquidation claims exceeded asset value did not eliminate common if it had a
present investment value.1 38 The SEC found that if all anticipated earnings,
absent reorganization, were applied to preferred arrearages they could be
eliminated in about 15 years. Thenceforward, $2,55,0DO annually would be
available for common dividends. 39 Thus, common bad a right to future in-
come which, "on an overall judgment basis... not susceptible of mathematical
computation," entitled it to a 5% share of Railways' stock. Preferred received
the remainder.'40
By determining common's value first, the SEC reversed bankruptcy re-
organization procedure. Findings that preferred was fully compensated by
the remainder were omitted, perhaps on the theory that the whole is equal
to the sum of its parts.' 4' Nor was any attempt made to determine whether
securities allocated to preferred in fact compensated it for loss of its
first claim on income and liquidation rights. Instead, the fact that common
surrendered 95% of any future claim to earnings it would have had before
reorganization, while preferred surrendered only 5% of its old priority, made
the plan fair and equitable.4'
In Otis & Co. V. SEC,143 preferred appealed this decision to the Supreme
Court. The Court sustained the plan on the theory that Congress had not
intended § 11 to render liquidation claims mature and thus visit the effects of
137. "Decisions like those in the Los Angeles Lumber and Boyd cases are predicated
on sets of facts fundamentally distinguishable from the situation arising here. . . .
Creditors and other claimants are prevented from foreclosing or otherwise compelling an
actual liquidation, but new securities are distributed among them according to their con-
tractual and other rights determined as though on liquidation.
"On the other hand, Power is a company virtually without debt and under no financial
embarrassment in the traditional bankruptcy or equity sense." Id. at 9.
138. Id. at 10-11. In reaching this result the SEC overruled its earlier dictum in
Federal Water Service Corporation, & S.E.C. 893, 910 (1941). Under the new rule,
liquidation preferences were merely a factor in determining the overall investment value.
For a full discussion of this case and its role in the development of the investment value
approach, see Comment, 61 Y.uE LJ. 656, 670 (1952).
139. United Light and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 1, 17-18 (1943). The 15-year estimate
was based on the rather unrealistic and optimistic assumption that all earnings during
that period would in fact be used to reduce preferred's arrearages. Ibid.
140. Id. at 18. This represented a reduction of common's interest from the 8.8%
proposed by the company. Cf. Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943), dis-
cussed pages 832-3 in! ra. § 11 cases by and large formed a ratio pattern between
years of arrearages and common participatiom See Comment, 61 Y,m LJ. 656, 672
n.lll (1952).
141. E.g., since common's value wvas 5%, preferred's must be 95% of 1.5 million.
142. United Light and Power Co., 13 S.E.C. 1, 18 (1943). While this theory may
not be entirely accurate in a reorganization context, preferred did receive at least one
additional benefit. It gained voting control of an $S1 million company.
143. 323 U.S. 624 (1945).
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public policy on one class to the benefit of another. Furthermore, since merger
or consolidation would achieve the result demanded by § 11 without raising
the liquidation issue, the SEC's approval of dissolution should not alter
common's rights. 144
Participation by common on the basis of possible rights in the distant future
reached an all-time high in Southern Colorado Power.1 4 i Again, assets 140
were insufficient to meet preferred's claims, which included $1.3 million in
dividend arrearages. 147 Applying the $15,000 annual excess of anticipated
future earnings over preferred's dividend claims, the SEC concluded "that
there is sufficient possibility that the Class A stock (common) might some
time receive some income from the company to warrant participation by Class
A stock in the reorganization." Preferred was awarded 95% of the new
equity, and Class A common 5%. 148
This conclusion, as Commissioner Healy pointed out in his dissent, is in-
compatible with any previously known theory of full compensation. On a
liquidation basis, preferred surrendered half its claim uncompensated and
received securities of lower dignity for the other half. On the Commission's
income basis, preferred arrearages would not be paid off for 95 years. Then
preferred would receive 34 cents per share of new common that, absent re-
organization, would have gone to old common. 149 In view of preferred's losses
it is difficult to see how an expectation so small and so distant satisfies full
compensation. Moreover, the division of new stock seems inconsistent with
United Light and Power. There, 15 years of arrearages entitled preferred to
95% participation, while here, with 95 years of arrearages, preferred received
the same percentage. 150
Even Southern Colorado, however, makes it clear that there are limitations
to the participation of junior interests. While allowing 5% to Class A com-
144. Otis & Co. v. SEC, 323 U.S. 624, 637-9 (1945). Three dissenting justices
argued that no amount of semantics could dodge the fact that this was a liquidation.
Therefore, preferred's liquidation rights applied, and since these would absorb all avail-
able securities, 5% of preferred's claim was being turned over to common in violation
of "absolute priority." Id. at 642-5.
145. 14 S.E.C. 115 (1943).
146. The company's asset accounts were admittedly unrealistic, including overstate-
ments of value as well as high values for utterly obsolete properties. The SEC ordered
these book assets of $15 million written down by over $6 million, and the plan was formulated
to comport with the written down asset figures. Southern Colorado Power Co., 14 S.E.C.
115, 134-8 (1943).
147. Id. at 125-6.
148. Id. at 130 (emphasis added). Future earnings after fixed charges were estimated
at $312,000 while preferred dividends, absent reorganization, were $297,000. Thus, $15,000
per year was the amount that could be applied to the $1,300,000 of arrearages
149. Id. at 143-6.
150. The finding that common had value appears even more strained in light of the
fact that feasibility required establishment of huge sinking funds. During the decade
after the plan these would absorb $120,000 of income, and thereafter $55,000, Id. at 132-3.
Either figure vastly exceeded the difference between preferred's old requirements and
net earnings.
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mon, the SEC did eliminate Class B. This stock could not receive any divi-
dends until Class A received $330,000 in the dividend year. This contingency
was so remote as to have no investment value.lnl Similarly, the Supreme Court
sustained the SEC's refusal to allow anything to stock warrants in Niagara
Hudson Power Corp. v. Lcvcntritt,l 2 despite the fact that they had a market
value. The Court reasoned that any compensation of these junior-most securi-
ties would have to come from amounts allocated to seniors and thus impinge
upon the SEC's determination that the plan compensated seniors full,.1M
But where a corporation's future prospects were far brighter than in
Southern Colorado, full compensation changed color. In J'irginia Public
Service Co.,154 estimated preferred arrearages were $3.8 million, while antici-
pated earnings exceeded annual preferred dividends by $500,000.15 Recog-
nizing a factor it had ignored in United Light and Power, the SEC pointed
out that all earnings could not feasibly be applied to arrearages; consequently
it would take 10 to 15 years to eliminate them. On the basis of these figures,
preferred received 91% of the equity and common 9%.oY The SEC concluded
that the permanent right to 91% of $1.2 million of annual earnings fully
compensated preferred for surrender of its preference claims to arrearages and
$600,000 in annual dividends. 1' 7
The dichotomy between "poor" and "rich" corporations is underscored
by SEC treatment of bondholders of prosperous utilities. In Communily Gas
and Power Company,1l 5 old debenture holders received 80o of the new com-
151. Id. at 130. The plan proposed by the company had allowed Class B 1.15- of the
new common. This portion of the plan was, therefore, disapproved. MWhen the company
amended the plan to eliminate Class B it received final SEC approval. Southern Colorado
Power Co., 14 S.E.C. 728 (1943).
152. 340 U.S. 336 (1951), r,'crrzg 179 F2d 615 (2d Cir. 1951), Note, 0 YALz LJ.
371 (1951). The Supreme Court indicated that a point e.isted where realization of value
in a going concern was too remote to be compensated. Niagara Hudson Power Corp. v.
Leventritt, 340 U.S. 336, 342-3 (1951). It may be questioned whether the value of
warrants in this case was any more remote than that of Class A common in Sorhcn;
Colorado.
153. Id. at 344, 347. The court added that the SEC's determination of zero as a value
vwas entitled to as much weight as its determination of any other figure. Mhid.
154. 14 S.E.C. 406 (1943).
155. Virginia Public Service Co., 14 S.E.C. 406, 431-2 (1943).
156. Id. at 433.
157. Id. at 431. In approving 95% participation of common, the SEC upped the figure
suggested by the company itself. This change was probably made possible by the Commis-
sion's order that $1,200,000 paid by Virginia to its parent must be returned. Id. at 418.
Similarly, in American Utilities Service Corp., 16 S.E.C. 173 (1944), a permanent
right to 85% of 45,000 in annual earnings fully compensated preferred for urrcnder of
dividend claims of $157,000 annually and arrearages of $790,000. The exchange was
thought compensatory because of nev common's unlimited access to profits. While this
reorganization would not have passed muster in a bankruptcy proceeding, this may well be
due to the difference in the method of claim valuation rather than to a different approach
to full compensation. Here earning power rather than liquidation rights -was the valua-
tion criterion, and on this basis compensation vas full.
158. 25 S.E.C. 92, approved, In re Community Gas & Power Co., 71 F. Supp. 171
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mon, while old common got 207o.'" The test of full compensation, said the
SEC, citing Du Bois and St. Paul, is "if [seniors] are allocated securities of
lesser quality than those surrendered, they must be compensated through an
increased share in the earnings above what they would have received had there
been no reorganization."' 160 Here the test was met, since debenture holders
received stock with anticipated earnings of $75.58 in exchange for their $60
interest claim and surrender of senior position.' 6 ' Again, in the Standard Gas
& Electric case, 62 the Third Circuit found that surrender of a 6% interest
rate in return for a projected earnings rate of 10%o fully compensated de-
bentures for loss of senior position. And in this case they also received 31%o
of their payment in cash. 63
Where senior claims are to be paid in cash, the SEC attitude contrasts even
more sharply with cases like Southern Colorado. Present investment value in
such situations took on a new shade of meaning. The test, accepted by the
Supreme Court in SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp.,1 4 is whether the cash
received is sufficient to allow senior claimants to purchase securities equivalent
to those surrendered. 6 5 Where the SEC measured compensation by determin-
ing the probable market value absent liquidation, it had therefore satisfied the
requirements of fairness and equity. 106 The only ceiling on this value is the
voluntary call price of the particular security, which the market price will never
exceed. 16T
Rejecting bond principal plus accrued interest as the § 11 test, the SEC in
American Power & Light Co.'68 spelled out the factors used in determining
investment value. The position of the debentures to be eliminated was ex-
tremely secure. Cash on hand and debt securities held by American covered
debenture principal 1.63 times; and fixed charges had been earned 1.41 times
from 1934 to 1944, while interest on the debentures was being earned 3.39
times. The safety factor was further heightened, since American's portfolio
(D. Del. 1947), aff'd, 168 F.2d 740 (3d Cir.), cert. denied sub norn, Caplan v. SEC,
334 U.S. 846 .(1948), Note, 49 COL. L. REv. 134 (1949).
159. In. re Community Gas & Power Co., 168 F.2d 740, 742 (1948).
160. Community Gas & Power Co., 25 S.E.C. 92, 108 (1947). "The primary measure
of debenture holders' participation is not the face amount of their claim or the market
value of the securities allocated. . . ." Ibid.
161. Id. at 104. ". . . [D]ebenture holders are receiving a claim to prospective
earnings substantially in excess of their present interest rates to compensate for their
reduced position in the system and the relinquishment of their claim to accrued conditional
interest." Id. at 108.
162. In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 151 F.2d 326 (3d Cir. 1945), cert. denied rub
nom. Guaranty Trust Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 796 (1946).
163. In re Standard Gas & Electric Co., 151 F.2d 326, 328, 328 n.4, 333 n.12 (3d
Cir. 1945).
164. 338 U.S. 96 (1949).
165. SEC v. Central-Illinois Corp., 338 U.S. 96, 144 (1949).
166. Id. at 140, 144.
167. Id. at 106, 144-5.
168. 21 S.E.C. 191, 197 (1945).
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contained many senior issues in other companies. foreover, comparable se-
curities had a 3% rate of return, while American debentures had a 6%
return."' 9 A 5.45% rate would, under SEC computations, give debentures an
investment value equal to their $110 voluntary call. They were entitled to
compensation in this amount since the ceiling had been reached. And one
issue, not callable for two years, was entitled to a premium over this amount.170
The early § 11 cases seem governed by an Euclidean conception of full
compensation. No examination of the amount necessary to fully compensate
preferred claimants was made. Instead, their participation was determined by
subtracting the residual interest of the old common from the total to be
distributed. By stretching its fact-finding powers to the limit, as in Southern
Colorado, the SEC found everyone fully compensated, thus by-passing pre-
ferred's lost seniority and the remoteness of common's expectations.
Where the SEC dealt with prosperous utilities, the results were quite differ-
ent. While liquidation values were uniformly discarded in favor of investment
value, senior interests in wealthier utilities received more substantial awards.
Where bonds and preferred received new securities, an attempt was made
to balance new income claims against old. And, in the case of bonds, bonus
income claims were given for surrender of senior rights. Moreover, where
sufficient cash was available, senior interests received money-payment for the
face amount of their claims. Thus, in some cases seniors received compensation
as full as or fuller than that given in bankruptcy reorganizations. In others,
"full compensation" was merely a meaningless phrase.
20b OF THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE AcT
Enacted in 1948, § 20b of the Interstate Commerce Act was the product of
dissatisfaction with § 77's lengthy and expensive proceedings and its elimina-
tion of junior interests on the eve of the war and post-war booms.l Section
20b allows railroads to bypass § 77 through a securities modification plan if
approval of the ICC and 75% of each class of security holders is obtained.
169. American Power & Light Co., 21 S.E.C. 191, 205-09 (1945).
170. This estimate of $110 was based on SEC calculations of the market rate for the
risk these bondholders bore. Id. at 211. As finally approved, the premium amounted to
5% of the face value of the bonds. Thus, they received $115 on their hundred dollar par
on the theory that they would, were it not for the reorganization, be called at the first
opportunity. American Power & Light Co., 21 S.E.C. 457, 453-9 (1945).
171. 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20b (Supp. 1952). For discussion of § 20b's
background, analysis of its procedures, and variant views as to its effects, see Hand &
Cummings, Consensual Securities Modification, 63 H"mv. L Rw, 957 (19F0); Hand &
Cummings, The Railroad Modification Law, 4S CoL. L REv. 6S9 (1948); Wren, Fcasi-
bility and Fairness in Section 20b Rcorganizations, 52 COL L. REv. 715 (1952); Comment,
Streamlhiwd Capital Rcadjustm ct Undcr Scction 20b of the Interstate Commncrce Act,
58 YAE L.J. 1291 (1949). § 20b's valuation of claims is analyzed and compared to other
reorganization valuation procedures in Comment, 61 YAE LJ. 655, 676-65 (1952).
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To approve, the ICC must find the plan in the "best interests" of each class,
and securities allocations "just and reasonable.' 1 2 The statute significantly
omits the words "fair and equitable" and makes plans binding on all security
holders, when approved.
Lehigh Valley 173 was the first case under 20b. The road, though solvent,
faced a bleak financial picture. Forty-five million dollars of first lien bonds,
comprising over one-third of all indebtedness, were due within eight years. In
addition, there were $71.7 million in second lien bonds (Generals) whose
fixed interest had not been met in eleven of the preceding twenty years. The
entire equity interest consisted of 1,200,000 shares of $50 par common.""
The plan provided for extension and staggering of senior bond maturities and
establishment of sinking funds. Three-fourths of Generals' interest was made
contingent and cumulative for three years; in return, they received four
shares of common per bond. Since the total stated value of common was un-
changed despite this 19% increase in the number of shares, old common stir-
rendered one-fifth of its equity to the Generals. 175
The ICC based its analysis on the proposition that the standards of full
compensation under 20b may vary from those applied "in a proceeding con-
templating liquidation of the carrier's property. 1 7  Although their maturities
were extended, Senior bonds were fully compensated by the resulting improve-
ment in the road's financial condition, new sinking funds and the comparatively
high interest rate on their bonds." 7 Generals gave up three-fourths of their
fixed claim for a contingent one, but were fully compensated by receipt of 19%
of the $60 million common equity and beneficial ICC amendments. 1 8
Perhaps inconsistently, the ICC emphasized the plan's fairness by pointing
out that all interests made some sacrifice. In the Commission's view, seniors
suffered least, Generals somewhat more, and common, through sinking funds,
172. The lan must also be in the public interest and "may not be adverse to the
interest of any creditor." 62 STAT. 163 (1948), 49 U.S.C. § 20b(2) (Supp. 1952).
173. Lehigh Valley R.R Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 553 (1949).
174. Id. at 554-5.
175. Id. at 556-67. The plan would reduce fixed charges by $2.3 million annually.
And, had it been in effect, fixed charges would have been earned in all but four of the
preceding twenty years.
176. Id. at 591.
177. Id. at 588. The interest rate on these bonds was, with a minor exception, 431%
or better, and over half carried 5% or 6% rates. Id. at 555. The ease with which bond-
holders were found fully compensated may in part be due to the fact that they did not
object to the plan.
178. Id. at 591-2. Objecting General bondholders argued that the plan violated "full
priority" -because the proposal itself proved that the obligation to Generals could not be
met and leave an interest for stockholders. Their equity must therefore be valueless,
and Generals, to be fully compensated, must receive all the common stock. Id. at 579-80.
But the ICC felt that only in exceptional years would Generals be injured by the change
from fixed to contingent interest. Id. at 589-90. To protect them further against occa-
sional periods of low income, their cumulative rights were extended to five years and
they were given the power to elect 1 of the road's directors whenever four years of
arrearages accrued. Id. at 593-4.
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dividend restrictions, and loss of one-fifth of their equity, yielded most. Be-
cause common was the junior security, it was entirely proper that they bear
the greatest loss. 179 The ICC then pronounced the plan "just and reasonable"
without reconciling its finding of full compensation with its dicta on relative
sacrifice.
This ambiguity was carried over into subsequent ICC opinions. In Mary-
land & Pennsylvania,180 the road relied on Lchigh Valley in making bond
interest contingent, cumulative for 5 years. In exchange, 4 shares of common
were to be issued per bond. The ICC held Lehigh Val!ey inapplicable because
the prospective earnings of the road might not cover the new contingent
charges. If this were allowed, bonds would make the na or sacrifice; the plan
was therefore amended to make interest fully cumulative.18' Bondholders
were then held fully compensated.
Again, in Southern Railways,18 2 findings resembled those in bankruptcy
proceedings but dictum did not. Due dates of matured 4% bonds were ex-
tended in return for payment in cash, 3% bonds, and common stock. Old
common surrendered 43% of its holdings and a substantial unsecured debt. '
Admitting the 3%o bond rate was low, the ICC nevertheless found bondholders
fully compensated. Earnings might at first fall short of the old 4% rate, but
would later exceed it as dividends on bondholders' common increased. In ad-
dition, bondholders obtained 43% of the common, sinking funds, and improved
security for new bonds. 8 4 While the plan could be translated into § 77 terms
as payment, part in cash, part in inferior securities (3 bonds), plus a com-
mon stock bonus, the Commission reasoned differently. Emphasizing the fact
that bondholders maintained an interest in a going concern, it felt liquidation
rights were not controlling. Moreover, bondholders would fare worse in
liquidation or § 77 proceedings.'81
Rejection of the plan proposed in Mainc Central 166 proved there was a
limit to 20b modification of senior rights. Arrearages on 5%, $100 par pre-
ferred had mounted to $85 per share. A substantial surplus was on hand
179. Id. at 592, 595.
180. Maryland & Pennsylvania R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 695 (1950).
181. Id. at 713-15. The 1940-1949 earnings of the road had averaged 12y% below
the new contingent charges.
182. Southern Ry. Abandonment, 271 I.C.C. 605 (1949). The reorganization arose
out of the Southern's abandonment of the Atlantic & Danville Railroad, which it had
operated for fifty years. The plan was devised to restore the latter company to operating
status and appears to have been supported as a community project by all security holders
of the Atlantic & Danville. Id. at 634, 639-40.
183. The Company owed them a total of $365,000 or $16.75 per share of stoc. Old
First Mortgage bonds received $400 in cash, a $1000 3% bond and two shares of common
per $1000 bond surrendered. Second Mortgage bonds recived 250 in cash, and one share
of common in addition to a new bond. Id. at 639-44.
184. Ibid.
186. Id. at 641-2. Because of the road's financial condition, bondholders would get
little except stock in a bankruptcy proceeding.
186. Maine Central R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 261 (1950).
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due to steadily increasing revenues, but management desired to fund the
arrearages and simultaneously to reduce preferred's dividend rate to 4%.
Common could then receive dividends without payment of preferred arrear-
ages. - 7 No other changes in capital structure were contemplated. The road
contended that the right to 4% on $185 was worth at least as much as the
right to 5% on $100 plus $85 in arrearages. 18
Unconvinced, preferred stockholders rejected the plan, and the ICC, indi-
cating doubt as to the proposal' s bona fides,18 9 supported them. In the Com-
mission's view arrearages constituted a priority, payment of which was guaran-
teed before common could receive dividends. The Commission was unable to
say whether "the applicant is offering the preferred stockholders the fair eco-
nomical equivalent of their present contract."'10 0 But it did find elimination
of preferred's arrearages, without any sacrifice by common, to be unnecessary,
and not in the best interests of preferred. 19' Thus, whatever else "best in-
terests" may require, it means that common must sacrifice if senior interests
are to be tampered with.
In sharp contrast, Boston & Maine 10 2 indicated the lengths to which "best
interests" could be stretched when the ICC thought the plan necessary.
Though the road's financial position was strong, it desired to simplify its com-
plicated capital structure and thus improve marketability of securities. The
stock structure consisted of: (1) prior preferred, (2) five series of first
preferred, (3) non-cumulative preferred, and (4) common. Arrearages on
prior preferred came to $119 per share, while those on first preferred ran from
$86.25 to $172.50 per share. One class each of preferred and common were
to be substituted for the old structure, and the par value of stock interests
reduced from $104.3 to $82.4 million.193 Prior preferred's high investment
value required that it receive the entire issue of new preferred plus one share
of new common for each of old prior preferred. 10 4 The ICC approved the
plan. Prior preferred received inferior securities with face amounts equaling
187. Id. at 262-8.
188. Id. at 273-4. See Comment, 61 YAr. L.J. 656, 679 (1952).
189. The Commission apparently was impressed with the fact that management
interests owned 46.9% of the common stock. Maine Central R.R. Securities Modification,
275 I.C.C. 261, 288 (1950).
190. Id. at 282.
191. Id. at 282-3. An additional reason for disapproval was that the plan was totally
unnecessary. Since it would not promote the financial stability of the company but would
merely allow common to receive dividends at an earlier date, the plan was outside the
scope of § 20b. Id. at 283-7.
192. Boston & Maine R.RL Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 397 (1950), aff'd
sub num. Sakis v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C.), appeal dimnissed, 344 U.S.
801 (1952).
193. Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification 275 I.C.C. 397, 401-02 (1950).
194. The road discounted the arrearage claim, which it estimated would not be
paid in full for 17 years, to a present worth of $78.91. It then figured that $140 of new
5% preferred equalled a $100 share of old 7%. Id. at 426 n.25. For a discussion of these
allocations, see Comment, 61 YAS UJ. 656, 681 (1952).
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the investment value surrendered. But because the new securities would, in
good years, yield a higher return than those surrendered, prior preferred was
fully compensated. Moreover, it obtained voting control of the company.05
Other allocations were more difficult. If the investment value of first pre-
ferred (next ranking issue) was fully satisfied, nothing would remain for the
junior classes. 196 And since, absent reorganization, the junior classes had no
dividend expectations for seventy-four years, the road admitted that any allo-
cations to them must be arbitrary.19 7 Still, they "could not be expected to vote
themselves out of existence,"'9  and they were therefore allotted small portions
of new common to obtain their acceptance of the plan. The ICC in effect
seconded this rejection of full compensation, but gave it a new gloss. First
preferred's losses were discounted because: (1) In years of low earnings they
would received some income where they would not have under the old struc-
ture; (2) they would receive income immediately instead of waiting 17 years
until prior preferred's arrearages were paid; (3) junior's interests were so
remote that first preferred was the de facto common and their loss of seniority
illusory. 99 Then, reversing its field, the Commission admitted that if first
preferred's claim was fully met, junior interests would be eliminated. Finally,
the ICC found the plan, including allocations made to junior classes, "just and
reasonable" because the road intended to pay all arrearages eventually.200 To
find otherwise, said the Commission, would give undue weight to liquidation
claims.20 1 Subsequently, a district court approved the plan, finding first pre-
ferred's treatment compensatory. -2 0 2
While prior preferred's treatment may satisfy traditional notions of full
compensation, the allocations between first preferred and junior interests do
not. The ICC's justifications of the plan do not hold water. The theory that
avoidance of prior preferred's arrearages compensated Firsts is fallacious;
195. In the future normal years the securities issued to prior preferrcd for each old
share and arrearages would return $9.41. And the predicted range of return was from
$6.68 to $12.60. Boston & Maine R.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 397, 443-4
(1950). Prior preferred shifted from holding 22%14 of voting power to control of 615.
Id. at 446.
196. Id. at 428-9.
197. Ibid.
198. Id. at 429.
199. Id. at 444-5. The Commission may have also felt that since junior classes were
receiving only 4% of the new common between them, their participation was de wfiw:is.
As finally approved, the plan allocated new securities per old share as follows:
New- Pfd Newv C.
Prior Preferred: 1.2 shs 1.0 slhs
First Preferred: 1.66 to 0.94 shs
Non-Cumulative Pfd: 0.07 shs
Common: 0.05 shs
Id. at 402, 450. Variations on first preferred were due to the five different issues.
200. Id. at 450.
201. Ibid.
202. Salds v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292, 302-3 (D.D.C. 1952). See Comment,
61 YLaz L.J. 656, 681 (1952).
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Firsts' claim was discounted because of these very same arrearages.2 0 3 Like-
wise, it is difficult to accept the argument that Firsts' lost seniority was worth-
less when classes junior to that seniority participate. And the ICC's explana-
tion that the road intended to pay its arrearages is equally unconvincing in the
face of the elimination of all arrearages. Furthermore, insistence that full
compensation of Firsts would overemphasize liquidation claims ignores the
fact that Firsts' rights were computed entirely on an investment value
basis.204 Finally, as if to add insult to injury, Firsts' voting power was re-
duced. 20
5
In at least one case, New Jersey Central,200 the ICC bluntly abandoned full
compensation as a 20b requirement. There, compensation for reduction of
bond interest rates would have required between $13.8 and $16 million in new
5%o preferred. Instead, bondholders received $13.7 million in Class A com-
mon, the remainder of their loss to be made up by income on that stock.
201
Since dividends on the new common were unlikely in the foreseeable future,
the ICC found bondholders not fully compensated.2 0 8 Nevertheless, the plan
was approved as "just and reasonable." Bondholders benefited from termination
of pending bankruptcy proceedings, continuation of traffic relations with the
Reading Railroad-the largest common stockholder, and general improvement
in the road's financial condition. Moreover, old common, in surrendering one-
half its equity, sacrificed more than bondholders. 20
The "best interests" and "just and reasonable" requirements of 20b have
become highly flexible tools in the hands of the ICC. Analysis of compensa-
tion, in terms of old claims and "something extra" for loss of senior rights, is
less intensive than under § 77.210 While Lehigh Valley and Southern Railway
might be rationalized to fit bankruptcy concepts of full compensation, 211 their
dicta as applied in Boston & Maine and New Jersey Central cannot. In the
203. Whereas prior preferred's arrearages were discounted for the seventeen years
necessary to pay them, first preferred's principal was discounted for this period, and
its arrearages were further discounted for the 74-year period estimated for their payment.
Boston & Maine M.R. Securities Modification, 275 I.C.C. 397, 426 n.25 (1950).
204. Ibid. Interestingly, the ICC argued that high earnings would compensate prior
preferred, id. at 443, and that low earnings would compensate first preferred. Id. at 444.
205. Before the plan, they had 37% of the voting power; afterwards, 36%. Id. at 446.
206. Central M.R. of New Jersey !Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 501 (1949).
207. Id. at 521-2.
208. Id. at 523.
209. Id. at 524.
210. Cf. Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 656, 678 (1952).
211. Lehigh Valley is probably closest to fitting the § 77 mold, since capitalization
of its average income for the 22-year period prior to reorganization would, at a 4%
rate, amount to $193.5 million. If capitalized at 4Y2%, the result would be $175.6 million.
These amounts fall rather close to the $189.5 million book value of pre-modification
securities. See Lehigh Valley R.R. Securities Modification, 271 I.C.C. 553, 555, 575-6 (1949)
for the figures on which these computations are based.
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first case implicitly, and in the second explicitly, the ICC scuttled full com-
pensation in deference to junior interests' plan-blocking power. The upshot
of these decisions is that absolute priority may be enforced so long as no junior
class is eliminated. Where strict adherence to full compensation would destroy
any class, the rules are changed. Shifting emphasis from payment of seniors
to preservation of juniors unfurls a new test. Plans will be found "just and
reasonable" if in the "best interests" of senior classes. And where, as in
Boston & Maine, junior interests suffer substantially greater losses than those
senior to them, the test is satisfied.
CONCLUSION
From the Boyd tree, bankruptcy cases have carved consistent doctrines of
full compensation. St. Paul is simply a more specific statement of Dza Bois'
general rule. Under both, junior classes may not participate until seniors re-
ceive something extra above the face amount of old claims for surrender of
contractual priorities. In practice, seniors receive partial qualitative su-
periority, as in the cash payments under the St. Paid remittitur and Deep Roe:
plans, or a quantitative "bonus" as in Wisconsin Central and Central States.
And in both settings preferred's seniority rights receive the same protection
accorded to bonds. While the Supreme Court has not spoken on the point,
there seems to be small reason to challenge analogous treatment of bonds and
preferred. The full compensation rule is as applicable to one seniority as an-
other, and congruent protection of contract rights probably fits investor ex-
pectations.21 2
The relative uniformity of bankruptcy cases highlights the latest Missouri-
Pacific's switch to market values as the measure of full compensation. Legal
support for this result must flow from the Rio Grande decision. But that case
merely holds that the Supreme Court will not reopen proceedings until showzen
that the cash value of seniors' compensation exceeds their claims. To carry
this case beyond its holding is to fly in the face of Boyd's dictum and St.
Paul's rejection of dollar valuation. Moreover, as the ICC has pointed out,
transient market values are an unreliable index of compensatory treatment.2 1
Feasibility requires a more stable standard, and economic theory demands a
yardstick more closely attuned to long term capital costs. Absent permanent
changes in the capital market, analysis of returns earned on book capital by
analogous enterprises would seem a more reliable measure of compensation
than market prices, which fluctuate with temporary changes in government
fiscal policy.
Interpretations of full compensation in non-bankruptcy reorganizations un-
der § 11 and § 20b are less uniform than their bankruptcy counterparts. While
212. See Comment, 61 YAL. L.J. 656, 684 (1952). The average security holder is
more likely to look upon himself as an investor than as either a creditor or part o,%ner.
Ibid.
213. Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb. 17, 1954,
p. 64.
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the doctrine is generally invoked, its application appears dominated by a desire
to avoid elimination of common stock. Where assets are sufficient to accom-
modate both full compensation and the common stock, treatment of seniors
has been as compensatory as in bankruptcy reorganizations, or more so.2 14 But
where assets are meager, Southern Colorado and Boston & Maine indicate
the extent to which both § 20b and § 11 allow strained findings of full com-
pensation to camouflage obliteration of senior contract rights.
The theory of relative sacrifice, whose seeds were sown in some § 11 cases,
blossomed in § 20b proceedings. So long as junior interests bear the greatest
losses, seniors may be found "fully compensated." Here, relative priority has
in effect supplanted absolute priority and has, through court approval of
Boston & Maine, received limited judicial support. 215 Thus, full compensation
is not one rule but two. Speedy enforcement of the Holding Company Act and
§ 20b's consensual nature are partially responsible for the schizophrenic nature
of full compensation. But the decisions indicate a more fundamental diagnosis.
In all reorganization settings, courts and commissions often insist that bank-
ruptcy and non-bankruptcy reorganizations should be insulated from one an-
other.216 They argue that only the former are substitutes for liquidation and
are thereby distinguished from non-bankruptcy proceedings. But this distinc-
tion which views bankruptcy reorganizations as liquidation's substitute is ques-
tionable both historically and practically. Bankruptcy may have sprung from
equity receiverships, but they were designed to preserve the business and
avoid the consequences of liquidation. Under the equity receivership, "fore-
closure sales" bore as little resemblance to reality as did "John Doe" of
Replevin fame.217 Moreover, the public interest demands the continued opera-
tion of railroads and public utilities, thus barring their liquidation. And other
large companies eschew liquidation because their value as going concerns
exceeds their liquidation value.218 In no meaningful sense, therefore, are bank-
ruptcy reorganizations a substitute for liquidation. A dual standard cannot
be justified by pointing to an intellectual mirage.
Relative sacrifice, flying the colors of absolute priority, may reduce senior
rights. Southern. Colorado and Boston & Maine, its § 20b counterpart, illus-
trate how the faintest of junior interests may be rewarded at the expense of
214. This thesis is vigorously advanced in Billyou, Priority Rights of Security
Holders in Bankruptcy Reorganization: New Directions, 67 HAuv. L. REv. 553 (1954).
215. See Salds v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 292 (D.D.C. 1952). The New Jersey
Central plan, however, has never been litigated.
216. See, e.g., Missouri Pacific R.R. Reorganization, ICC Finance Dkt. 9918, Feb.
17, 1954, pp. 89-90; Central States Electric Co. v. Austrian, 183 F.2d 879 (4th Cir. 1950) ;
American Power & Light Co., 21 S.E.C. 191, 198 (1945); Lehigh Valley R.R. Securities
Modification, 271 I.C.C. 553, 591 (1949).
217. Billyou, supra note 214, at 580-5; Weiner, Conflicting Fninctions of the Upset
Price in a Corporate Reorganization, 27 CoL. L. R~v. 132 (1927); Frank, Some Realistic
Reflections on Some Aspects of Corporate Reorganization, 19 VA. L. Ray. 541; 19 VA.
L. Ray. 698 (1933).
21& See Comment, 61 YALE L.J. 656, 683-4 (1952).
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senior claimants. And New Jersey Central proves that when "relative sacri-
fice" is coupled with consensual procedures, full compensation may go by the
boards. Thus, § 20b may demonstrate that its "atavistic procedure ... could
have been lifted from a railroad director's dream"2 19 and reduce contractual
priorities to railway tickets "good for this day and train only."2- Only across-
the-board insistence on absolute priority and its "something extra" corollary
will prevent junior participation from eroding the contract rights given as
consideration for investment in senior securities.
219. Comment, Streanlined Capital Rcadjustmzent Under Section 20b of the I ter-
state Commerce Act, 58 YALE L.J. 1291 (1949).
220. See Justice Roberts' dissent in Smith v. Aivright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944).
